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DOCKET NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. JACKSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SPANISH FoRK WEsT FIELD IRRIGATION
CoMPANY, 'a corporation, SPANISH FoRK
SouTH IRRIGATION CoMPANY, a corporation, SPANISH FoRK SouTHEAST IRRIGATION CoMPANY, a corporation, THE
SALEM' IRRIGATION AND CANAL CoMPANY,
a corporation, SPANISH FoRie EAsT
BENCH IRRIGATION AND .MANUFACTURING
CoMPANY, a corporation, LAICE SHORE
IRRIGATION CoMPANY, En WATSON, State
Engineer of the State of Utah, a corporation, and "\VAYNE FRANCEs,

Case No. 7450

Defendants and Appellamts.

BRIEF ON RE-HEARING

The appellants have received a communication from
the clerk of this court under date of April 16, 1951
wherein it is recited that "The Court has this day
granted a Re-Hearing in the case of ·willi'am D. Jackson
vs. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Company, et al,
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No. 7450 for the sole purpose of determining vYhether the
decree below should be modified as to the use during
the non-irrigation season.''
While the Order cloes not expressly state what, if
anything, has been done with the other grounds upon
which the appellants seek a re-he·aring, we are hopeful
that the Court will grant the relief sought in accordance
with appellants contention without further argument
with respect thereto. However that may be, we find it
difficult, if not impossible, to confine our argument on
re-hearing to that period of time referred to as the nonirrigation season. Such difficulty ·arises because first,
there is an absence of evidence as to when the irrigation
season begins and ends, and second ; in the main the
reasons that appellants claim the evidence fails to support the decree appealed from ·applies equally to the
irrigation and non-irrigation season.
At the outset it is obvious that the appellants, being
as they are, mutual irrigation companies engaged in
the control and distribution of water for irrigation
purposes to their stock holders, clo not themselves
directly suffer any injury because the decree appealed
from awards a flow of one second foot of water to the
plaintiff during the non-irrigation season. In our Brief
seeking a rehearing, we mentioned the fact that the
winter water was in demand for the purpose of generating electricity during the winter season by companies in
which the appellants are interested.
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At the trial of this cause, plaintiff offered no evidence whatsoever as to any quantity of water beneficially used by him during the non-irrigation season.
·when, by its order, this court indicated that the parties
were to confine their argument to the non-irrigation
season, it would seem that the court did not wish to
hear further argument touching the use of water during
that season of the year when water may be beneficially
used for irrigation. If the argument is to be confined to
the "non-irrigation" season which we understand to
mean ·when -..vater cannot be beneficially used for irrigation, then there would seem to be little, if anything, to
argue about. Prior to the decision of this case, the law, as
we understand the numerous pronouncements of this
court, has been uniform in holding that a water right cannot be acquired by adverse use or appropriation except to
the extent of the beneficial use thereof. That being so,
it would seem to necessarily follow that during nonirrigation seasons, that is when no benefit is derived by
the application of water to the land, no right can be acquired to the use of water in such manner no matter how
long continued.
In this case there was some evidence tending to
shO\v that throughout the year water was diverted from
a tributary of Spanish Fork River into and along the
ditch to the west of the Jackson property from which
it was concluded that such water was, throughout the
entire year, adversely and under claim of right used
by the predecessors of the plaintiff.
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In our original Brief ·and in greater detail in our
Brief in support of our Petition for a Re-hearing, we
have at some length discussed the elements necessary
to acquire title to a water right by adverse use ancl
wherein the evidence in this case fails to establish the
necessary elements to thus acquire a water right during
the non-irrigation season, or at all.
The doctrine of the acquisition of title to a right
to the use of water by adverse use is analagous to the
acquisition of a title to land by adverse use. As is said
by this Court in the case of Investment & Trust Co. vs.
Board of Edt~cation, 35 Utah 2; 7; 99 Pac. 150-"It may
be conceded that a mere passive possession without intending to claim the property, is insufficient, regardless
of the length of time such a possession continues, or
however open, notorious or exclusive it may have been.
This is so because such a possession is not adverse to
the rights and title of the real owner. It is not the
mere possession that determines the rights of the parties,
but it is the character of the possession that controls."
As stated in our Brief in support of the Petition for a
Re-hearing, there is not one scintilla of evidence that
either Leven Simmons or Spencer Simmons, who owned
the land when it is claimed title was acquired by adverse use, even claimed any water in Spanish Fork
River adversely to that decreed to the various parties
by the McCarty Decree, and that purchased from the
United States Government under its Strawberry Project. On the contrary, at all times prior to the controversy which led up to the present action, so far as is
made to appear, plaintiff and his predecessors, without
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one vvord of protest, submitted to the regulation of the
waters of Spanish Fork River in conformity with the
McCarty Decree and the water purchased from the
United States. Certainly there is nothing in this record
which shows, or tends to show, that the plaintiff acquired
any right to the use of any of the waters of Spanish
Fork River by adversely using any water during the
non-irrigation season that had been decreed to the appellants.
It will be seen that by the McCarty Decree, the
principal provisions of which are set out in our original
Brief, only a small quantity of water was awarded to the
appellants during the non-irrigation season. We do not
and have not contended that the rights to the use of the
waters of Spanish Fork River awarded to the appellants
during the non-irrigation season have or will be interferred with by plaintiff's use of one second foot of water
during the non-irrigation season when the appellants
have no use for such water. Obviously the plaintiff
could not acquire a water right by adverse use in the
absence of the use being adverse to the rights of someone who owned such rights. That is to say, the plaintiff
could not acquire title to the one second foot of water
by adverse use unless the appellants owned such water
right during the years that plaintiff claims to have
diverted such water into the ditch to the west of his
land. There can be no adverse use of public water and
since 1903 no title to such waters can be acquired without a compliance with the law touching the filing upon
such waters in the office of the State Engineer. Deseret
Live Stock Co. vs. llooppiania 66 Ut. 25, ~39 Pac. 479
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Among the cases in this jurisdiction that shed light
on the use of ,,~ater at a time it cannot be put to a beneficial use ·are II ardy vs. Beaver County Irrigation Cornpany, 65 Utah 28; 234 Pac. 524; Cleary vs. Daniels, 50
Utah 494; 167 Pac. 820; Jensen vs. Birch Creek Ranch,
76 Utah 356; 289 Pac. 1097. It is, of course, of the very
essence of the law relating to the use of water in this
arid region that beneficial use is the measure and the
limit of the right to its use. That being so, we refrain
from citing the numerous cases so holding. In our search
for, and examination of cases in this jurisdiction dealing with the beneficial use of water and the correlated
question of the duty of water, we have been unable to
find a case and we think none can be found where a continuous flow of one second foot of water has been awarded
for the irrigation of as little as 19 acres of land, especially where such land already has a water right such
as the evidence shows the plaintiff's property has. \Ve
submit that the courts will take judicial notice that a
continuous flow of one record foot of water cannot be
put to a beneficial use during the non-irrigation season
~where the only possible use is to provide water for a
few livestock and there is a total absence of evidence
as to the quantity that will be consumed by such livestock.
An examination of the cases which fix the irrigation
season vary somewhat, but quite frequently the irrigation
season is fixed at six months, extending from April 1st
to October 1st, a period of 183 days. A second foot of
>vater flows substantially two acre feet in twenty-four
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hours. Thus in 183 days, a continuous flow of a foot
of water will flow 366 acre feet, which is substantially
19.8 acre feet per acre on the Jackson land. In addition
to such water he had on the land and appurtenant thereto, the Strawberry ·water of one acre foot, plus the
.McCarty decreed water which would make the water available during ·a six month period of in excess of 21 acre
feet of water per acre. That certainly is quite some
moisture. Such ·a quantity of water would seem to be
more than sufficient to satisfy the fondest desires of
the most ardent water hog to be found anywhere. It is
more than four times the maximum amount of water that
Dr. Farnsworth, plaintiff's witness, testified could be
beneficially used upon the Jackson farm; that is to say,
he placed the maximum at 60 inches. Trs. 338 In making
this statement, we have not overlooked the testimony of
the witness Farnsworth when he said that a second
foot of water could be beneficially used on the Jackson
property. He did not elaborate upon such statement and
we must engage in some speculation to determine whether
or not he meant that a stream of one second foot rather
than ·a larger or smaller stream could be beneficially and
economically used in irrigating the Jackson farm or
whether he meant, as the trial court apparently believed
and found, that a constant flow of a second foot could
be beneficially used on the J·ackson farm throughout
the entire year. Certainly if the testimony of Farnsworth is given full credit, not to exceed 60 inches of
water per annum can be beneficially used upon the
Jackson property in any year.
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\Ve have again directed the attention of the court
to the evidence when viewed in a light most f•avorable
to the plaintiff vvith the thought in mind that upon this
record the decree appealed from awards to the plaintiff
a water right far in excess of the amount testified to by
plaintiff's witnesses, and far in excess of any ·award that
has been sustained by this and, so far as we are advised,
any other appellate court. If such an award is permitted
to stand, it will be a departure from the repeated holdings of this court to the effect that water is the life
blood in this arid region and the courts will not sustain
an award of a water right beyond the amount that has
or can be put to a beneficial use.
In light of this record, we submit that the cause
should be remanded to the court below with leave for
the parties to offer additional evidence to the end that
these appellants will not be unjustly deprived of their
water rights ·and the doctrine that the beneficial use
of water is the extent and limit of the right that may
be acquired to the use of the waters in this state is still
the law. If that should be done, we apprehend that very
material light will be shed upon this controversy as to
whether or not the respondent has or could put to a
beneficial use the water which has been awarded to him.
Respectfully submitted,

ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorney for Appellants.

